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DOES AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION  JUSTIFY THE 
ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT? 
 
Steven C. Bennett 
 
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 1  Senators Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, and Representative Hank Johnson 
announced their intention to re-introduce proposed legislation, known as the “Arbitration Fairness 
Act” (the “AFA” or the “Act”).  Senator Franken described AT&T Mobility as “another example 
of the Supreme Court favoring corporations over consumers,” and claimed that the AFA would 
“rectify the Court’s most recent wrong by restoring consumer rights.”2  Many consumer and 
employment rights groups echoed that sentiment.3   
Yet, as this Article explains, the AFA does not address the essential concerns of 
opponents of the AT&T Mobility ruling.  Indeed, the central mechanism of the Act (invalidating 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in various categories) may create more problems than it solves.  
This Article suggests that the Court’s ruling in AT&T Mobility does not justify congressional 
action. Moreover, as an alternative, this article suggests that refinement in arbitration procedures 
and technologies, coupled with heightened consumer and employee education and awareness 
campaigns may substantially solve the perceived problems advanced as justifications for the Act. 
                                                     
* Steven C. Bennett is a partner at Jones Day in New York City and an adjunct professor of law at Hofstra and 
New York Law School.  The views expressed are solely those of the Author and should not be attributed to the 
Author’s firm or its clients. 
1 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
2 Press Release, Franken.Senate.gov, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Announce Legislation 
Giving Consumers More Power In The Courts Against Corporations (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1466.  Rep. Johnson’s statement similarly referred to AT&T 
Mobility, and noted: “Forced arbitration clauses undermine our indelible Constitutional right to take our disputes to 
Court[.] . . . They benefit powerful business interests at the expense of American consumers and workers.”  See Press 
Release, HankJohnson.House.Gov, Rep. Hank Johnson, Sens. Franken and Blumenthal Introduce Legislation to Protect 
Legal Rights of Consumers (May 17, 2011), http://hankjohnson.house.gov/2011/05/sens-franken-blumenthal-rep-hank-
johnson-to-hold-press-conference-announcing-legislation-to-protect.shtml. 
3 See, e.g., Press Release,  Alliance for Justice,  AFJ Praises Legislative Fix for Anti-Consumer Ruling in AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion (May 17, 2011), http://www.afj.org/press/05172011.html. (“This Corporate Court, at the behest 
of big-business interests, has time and again sought to restrict the rights of everyday Americans, but in this case there is 
a remedy. Alliance for Justice strongly supports the Arbitration Fairness Act . . . .”); Press Release, National 
Consumers Leauge, National Consumers League Applauds Legislative Fix For The Court’s Anti-Consumer Ruling In 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (May 18, 2011), http://www.nclnet.org/newsroom/press-releases/506-national-
consumers-league-applauds-legislative-fix-for-the-courts-anti-consumer-ruling-in-atat-mobility-v-concepcion; Press 
Release, National Employment Lawyers Association, NELA Vows To Overturn U.S. Supreme Court Decision, AT&T 
v. Concepcion Validating Class-Action Bans in Arbitration Agreements (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nela.org/NELA/docDownload/32871 (“‘The Concepcion decision effectively eliminates an important 
means for enforcing longstanding civil rights and employee protections[.]’ . . . ‘This case presents a missed opportunity 
for the Supreme Court to protect America’s workers from ad-hoc, arbitrary, and unexamined decisions by their 
employers[.]’ . . . NELA is at the forefront in banning forced arbitration and will continue to advocate in Congress for 
the passage of the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) of 2011.”); Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
2011, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html (referring to AT&T Mobility as a 
“model” for how corporations “can avoid class actions,” and suggesting that AFA is a “welcome effort to protect 
consumers, employees and others” in response).   
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT 
Over the course of the last decade, congressional policy-makers have considered the 
merits of various forms4 of an Arbitration Fairness Act.5  Although the specific terms of the 
proposals have varied,6 the essential notion of the Act’s proponents is that Congress should 
modify the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)7 to render unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements involving consumers, employees and others who may have little understanding of the 
arbitration process, or a limited ability to negotiate terms for arbitration in advance of a dispute.8  
Proponents of the Act describe these agreements as “forced” or “mandatory” arbitration 
contracts,9 in which the “deck is stacked” against employees and consumers by procedures that 
favor the corporation over the individual.10   
                                                     
4 Some forms of AFA-style legislation have focused on specific segments of the economy, or specific statutory 
claims.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (barring pre-dispute arbitration agreements between automobile 
manufacturers and car dealerships); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); 
Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); Rape Victims Act of 2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009) (prohibiting employer from enforcing arbitration agreements in employment contracts where employee 
alleges rape). 
5 See, e.g., H.R. 815, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2435, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 
3809, 108th Cong. §§ 511-514 (2004); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 5129, 
110th Cong. §§ 421–424 (2008); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).  See generally Thomas 
E. Carbonneau, "Arbitracide": The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 
233 (2007); Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, (FSU College of Law, Public Research Paper No. 
493, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793303.  Arguably, the debate over a need for 
congressional action on arbitration began even earlier.  See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and 
Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 402 (1996) (suggesting that, “[i]f we are to have sound arbitration law, there is 
no place to look for it except in the halls of Congress.”). 
6 A version of the proposed Act, introduced by Rep. Johnson in 2009, for example, included a reference to 
“franchise” disputes.  See H.R. 1020, 111th Cong.§4(b)(1) (1st Sess. 2009), text available at www.govtrack.us.  That 
reference was omitted in the 2011 version of the Act.   
7 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
8 For background on the lower court decisions in AT&T Mobility, see Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, 
Preemption of California’s Standard of Review of Class Arbitration Waivers, N.Y.L.J., June 25, 2010.  For background 
on the debate over adhesion arbitration contracts, see Steven C. Bennett & Dean Calloway, A Closer Look at the 
Raging Consumer Arbitration Debate, 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 28 (2010); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to 
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 
33, 108 (suggesting that individuals are in “no position” to understand and avoid or alter the “form contract terms 
presented by the market”; “if all the firms in the market impose the same terms, shopping is impossible”). 
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 
113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081 (2009); Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act, 12 J. 
CONSUMER & COM. L. 151 (2009); Michael A. Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History Demands 
Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 19 (2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004).  There has been some effort to avoid the term.  See Stephen J. Ware, Employment 
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 105 (1996) (noting potential confusion over use of the 
term “mandatory” in the context of employment arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory 
Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 43 (2003) (suggesting that theorists “stop 
calling contractual arbitration—mandatory arbitration”); id. at 44 (“Arbitration is not mandatory when it arises out of a 
contract, because contracts are formed voluntarily.”).  See generally Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and 
Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 273 (2007) (noting that “labels can 
be important in dispute resolution, both for the legitimacy of the process as well as its legal and ethical consequences”). 
10 See National Employment Lawyers Association, An Assault on Civil and Workers’ Rights: Why Congress Must 
Ban Forced Arbitration of Employment Cases, NELA.org (June 2010), 
105 
Indeed, the “findings” suggested in the version of the Act recently offered by Senators 
Franken, Blumenthal, and Representative Johnson11 directly criticize the fairness of arbitration in 
employment, consumer, and civil rights disputes.12  The drafters suggest that “[a]rbitration can be 
an acceptable alternative” to litigation, but only “when consent to the arbitration is truly 
voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises.”13  The 2011 version of the Act would require that 
“a court, rather than an arbitrator,” decide whether the AFA applies to a specific dispute, applying 
“federal law.”14   
Although not expressly stated as a justification in the “findings” supporting the Act, a 
secondary justification for the AFA also arises.  On this view, “forced” arbitration agreements are 
not simply unfair because of the lack of “truly voluntary” consent from the individual, but also 
because such arbitration agreements may actually be intended by large institutions to “suppress” 
the exercise of civil rights.15  Thus, the argument goes, large institutions seek to prevent “low 
 
(continued…) 
 
http://www.nela.org/NELA/docDownload/29983 (suggesting that “[m]any arbitrators work repeatedly for the same 
companies,” “[a]rbitrators don’t have to be lawyers or know the law,” “there is no effective appeal from an arbitrator’s 
decision,” “[a]rbitration is secret . . . and there is no public record of what happens,” and  “[a]rbitrators don’t have to 
justify their decisions, render written decisions, or even follow the law”); Letter from various interest groups to Patrick 
Leahy, Chairman, and Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.fairarbitrationnow.org/sites/default/files/AFA%20Senate%20Support%20Letter%20Oct2011.pdf. (“Forced 
arbitration erodes traditional legal safeguards as well as substantive civil rights and consumer protection laws… [w]ith 
nearly no oversight or accountability, businesses or their chosen arbitration firms set the rules for the secret 
proceedings, often limiting the procedural protections and remedies otherwise available to individuals in a court of 
law.”).  See generally David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, 
And Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 49, 53 (2003). 
11 See S. 987, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at www.govtrack.us.  Representative Johnson introduced 
the identical text of the Act in H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at www.govtrack.us.  
12 See S. 987 § 2 (stating that the FAA was intended to apply to “commercial entities of generally similar 
sophistication and bargaining power”; the Supreme Court has “changed the meaning” of the FAA to apply it to 
consumer and employment disputes; “[m]ost consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice whether to 
submit their claims to arbitration”; and “[m]andatory arbitration undermines the development of public law because 
there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions”). 
13 Id. § 2(5).  The 2011 version of the AFA does not outline what might be required to make a post-dispute 
agreement to arbitrate “truly voluntary.” 
14 Id. § 402(b)(1). 
15 See Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing on S. 931 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 
(2011) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Senior Attorney, Pub. Justice), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-10-
13BlandTestimony.pdf (“mandatory” arbitration clauses “have the effect of immunizing corporations from any liability 
or accountability,” and “undermines the marketplace when there is no enforcement of the rules of the road”); David S. 
Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2011), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1761675  (“The compelling logic of what is commonly called 
‘mandatory arbitration’ is that it is intended to suppress claims.”); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and 
Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1323 (2009); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, 
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 
41 MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008) (study claiming that “absence of arbitration provisions [in corporations’] 
material contracts suggests that many firms value, even prefer, litigation over arbitration to resolve disputes with 
peers.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 173 (2006) 
(“Every indication is that the imposed arbitration clauses are nothing but a shield against legal accountability by the 
credit card companies.”); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern 
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 412 (2005) (suggesting “vast potential reach” of class action waivers as shield for 
misconduct). 
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stakes” cases from becoming “high stakes” matters, by avoiding consolidated or class action 
proceedings in court.16   
That the AFA has been introduced repeatedly in Congress without progressing past 
committee suggests that the legislation lacks any real chance of adoption.17  Yet, proponents have 
achieved some success in enacting pre-dispute arbitration agreement bans in specific areas.18  For 
example, the 2006 Talent-Nelson Amendment to the Defense Authorization Act provided the 
Defense Department with authority to ban or restrict mandatory arbitration clauses in lending 
agreements with service members.19  In 2009, moreover, in response to a notorious military 
case, 20  Congress enacted the “Jamie Leigh Jones Amendment” regarding 2010 Defense 
Department appropriations, prohibiting the award of large Defense contracts to any company 
using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering Title VII and sexual assault-related 
tort claims.21 Congress also enacted a "whistleblower" protection provision in the 2009 stimulus 
bill, which provides that certain whistleblower claims cannot be subject to arbitration.22  Further, 
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 provided for creation of a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
with the authority (among other things) to regulate pre-dispute arbitration agreements between 
                                                     
16 See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, supra note 15, at 240 (citing Samuel 
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Pre-dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 567 (2001) and other authorities). 
17  See Russ Bleemer, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony for Today’s Arbitration Fairness Hearing, 
Resources, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/729/Senate-Judiciary-Committee-Testimony-for-
Todays-Arbitration-Fairness-Hearing-Oct-13.aspx (AFA bill “won’t get through the Republican-controlled House”); 
Steven J. Mintz, Supreme Court Favors Class Action Waivers In Arbitration, Litigation News, AM. BAR ASSOC (Aug. 
30, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/articles-print/summer2011-supreme-court-class-action-
waivers.html (“Given that the relevant House committees are now controlled by Republicans and that one of the 
[AFA’s] strong proponents [Sen. Feingold] was not reelected in 2010, passage in this Congress seems unlikely.  But the 
issue will not go away[.]”).    
18 See Deepak Gupta, Why and How We Should Ban Class-Action Bans, 4 (Mar. 17-18, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript, http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/2010-2011Events/Documents/Gupta%20Submission.pdf) (suggesting that 
AFA “faces widespread opposition from virtually the entire business community,” and that a “more successful and 
promising legislative approach has been to target mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in particular contexts, such 
as mortgage lending and auto contracts”). 
19 See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2006) (providing authority to ban or restrict pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
lending agreements with military service personnel).   
20 See generally Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009); Wade Goodwyn, Rape Case Highlights 
Arbitration Debate, NPR (June 18, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105153315. 
21 Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8166, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454.  
22 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(d), 123 Stat. 115, 297. 
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consumers and financial service providers.23  Thus, it appears that the debate over pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements will continue, at least in some form.24 
II. SUMMARY OF THE AT&T MOBILITY LLC V.  CONCEPCION DECISION 
On its face, the notion that AT&T Mobility justifies the enactment of the AFA is 
overbroad.25  The essential structure of the AFA was proposed long before the decision in AT&T 
Mobility. 26   The decision, moreover, did not validate all forms of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements; nor did it suggest that exceptions to enforcement of pre-dispute agreements, already 
outlined in the FAA and judicially recognized, must be limited.27  Instead, in AT&T Mobility, the 
                                                     
23 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010); Christopher J. Keller & Michael W. Stocker, Is the Shield Beginning to Crack?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 2010, at S8.  
See generally Lea Haber Kuck & Gregory A. Litt, Will Stolt-Nielsen Push Consumer, Employment and Franchise 
Disputes Back Into the Courts?, 4 N.Y.S.B.A. NEW YORK DISPUTE RESOL. LAWYER 16 (2011). The Dodd-Frank law 
requires the Bureau to complete a formal study of the use of binding arbitration agreements, after which it may use its 
regulatory power to limit or fully prohibit arbitration agreements in financial services contracts.  See Pub. L. No. 111-
203 § 1028. 
24 See Amy Schmitz, Arbitration Ambush in a Policy Polemic, 3 PENN ST. YEARBOOK ON ARB. & MED. 52, 53 
(2011) (noting that debate over arbitration has been caught up in a “firestorm” of issues involving “public power and 
control over private contracts,” arising out of the financial crisis); F. Paul Bland & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class 
Action Bans in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 369, 393 (2009) (enforceability of 
class action waivers is “one of the most hotly contested issues in all of consumer and employee litigation”). 
25  See Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration Fairness Act, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 13, 2011), 
www.scotusblog.com (“enacting the AFA would be an overbroad response to the Court’s decision in Concepcion”; the 
Act “would do more than simply reverse Concepcion”); see also David L. Gregory & Edward McNamara, Mandatory 
Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 419, 458 (2010) (suggesting that AFA is “a gross overreaction to the proven efficacy and fairness of labor 
and employment arbitration”); E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers From 
Legislation Invalidating Pre-dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 600 (2009) 
(suggesting that AFA is “too broad,” and that it should “exempt claims by or against certain high-level employees and 
claims by or against certain small employers”). 
26  Indeed, nearly a year before AT&T Mobility was decided, one commentator had already predicted a 
“showdown” between Congress and the Court on arbitration law.  See Marcia Coyle, Arbitration Showdown Looms 
Between Congress, Supreme Court; Congress, high court take opposing views of mandatory agreements, THE NAT’L L. 
J. (ONLINE), June 14, 2010, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/research/Default.aspx?e=&pp=002&com=2&com=2&ORIGINATION_CODE=
00086&searchtype=get&search=128+s%20ct.%202709&autosubmit=yes&topframe=on&powernav=on&tocdisplay=of
f&cookie=yes. 
27  The Court in AT&T Mobility recognized the “saving” clause of the FAA (Section 2), which preserves 
“generally applicable contract defenses.”  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011); see 
also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing for enforcement of arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract”).  The Court held that the intent of the FAA cannot be to “destroy itself,” 
thus, the “grounds” available under FAA Section 2 “should not be construed to include a State’s mere preference for 
procedures that are incompatible with arbitration.” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quotation omitted).   
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Court applied a relatively straightforward analysis.  Under the FAA,28 a state law that “prohibits 
outright” the arbitration of claims is preempted by federal law.29  Therefore, a rule classifying an 
arbitration agreement as “unconscionable,” for failure to follow specific procedures, may be 
invalid.30  The Court applied these precepts to the rule established by the California Supreme 
Court in the Discover Bank case to the effect that waiver of rights to consumer class action, even 
in the context of an arbitration agreement, may be unconscionable.31  In effect, the Court held that 
the California rule required a specific form of procedure (class arbitration) for a certain class of 
arbitration agreements, thus violating principles of federal preemption.32 
The dissent in AT&T Mobility did not suggest that application of the Discover Bank rule 
would generally invalidate consumer arbitration agreements, in favor of class actions.33  Instead, 
the dissent focused on the majority view that Discover Bank would compel “class arbitration” 
procedures for consumer disputes, thus discouraging the use of arbitration agreements.34  Indeed, 
the dissent challenged the majority view that arbitration is somehow “poorly suited” to “high-
stakes” class action litigation (thereby challenging the view that a rule compelling class 
arbitration of certain disputes might discourage arbitration).35   
Whatever the merits of in-court class action procedures versus class arbitration, little 
evidence supports the view that AT&T Mobility may somehow produce a “gold rush” of 
corporations embracing arbitration (coupled with class arbitration waivers) to avoid large stakes 
                                                     
28 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Clause (on 
which the FAA is based) and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution require that state laws singling out 
arbitration clauses for special limitations must be voided.  "In enacting § 2 of the Federal Act, Congress declared a 
national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration[.]" See id. at 10.  The Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed that view.  See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008); Doctor’s Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681, 685 (1996).  Some vehement criticisms of the Court’s Southland preemption doctrine have arisen.  See, e.g., David 
S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (2004) (arguing that “Southland is wrong, and the justifications for it 
are wrong”). 
29 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
30 See id. 
31 In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), the California Supreme Court held an 
arbitration provision unconscionable in the context of a consumer contract of “adhesion.”  The court stated: “But when 
the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power 
has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, 
then at least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in practice the 
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for its own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ . . . 
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.” Id.    
32 See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–53; see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 
1758, 1775 (2010) (“[C]lass-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be 
presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”).  But see S.I. Strong, 
Does Class Arbitration “Change The Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791928 
(suggesting that “class arbitration is not significantly more complicated than international or investment arbitration”).   
33 See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (suggesting that Discover Bank rule is “consistent” with the basic 
purpose of the FAA).   
34 See id. at 1758 (“[C]lass arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration.”). 
35 See id. at 1760 (noting “numerous counterexamples” of high-stakes disputes in arbitration). 
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class disputes.36  As Professor Christopher R. Drahozal summarized, in testimony before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, most consumer contracts do not contain arbitration clauses, and it is 
“unlikely” that many businesses will respond to the decision by switching to arbitration.37 
If Congress wished to do so, moreover, it could mandate that arbitration of consumer, 
employment or other types of cases must include an option for class arbitration procedures.  
Alternatively (and more broadly) Congress might grant consumers, employees and others a right 
to avoid arbitration (at their option) in favor of class action proceedings in court for all, or a 
selected set of cases.38 
Thus, the National Labor Relations Board, in its recent decision in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
Cuda,39 held that Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which protects the 
rights of employees to engage in “concerted activities” for purposes of collective bargaining or 
“other mutual aid or protection,”40 necessarily includes protection of the rights of employees to 
proceed by class action to address grievances against their employers.41  According to the Board, 
the NLRA precludes employers from requiring employees to waive their rights to such 
“protected” class action activity.42   
                                                     
36 Editorial reaction to AT&T Mobility immediately suggested this possibility.  See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme 
Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 7, 2010, at E8, available at 
www.articles.sfgate.com (“If the court goes down AT&T's path, the consequences could be staggering. It could be the 
end of class action litigation.”); Adam T. Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts that Prohibit Class-Action 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 2011, at B3, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html (“The decision basically lets companies escape class 
actions, so long as they do so by means of arbitration agreements.” (quoting Brian T. Fitzpatrick, law professor at 
Vanderbilt University); Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class Actions?, WALL 
ST. J. L. BLOG http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions/ 
(April 27, 2011, 14:36 EST) (“Once given the green light, it is hard to imagine any company would not want its 
shareholders, consumers and employees to agree to such provisions.” (quoting Brian T. Fitzpatrick, law professor at 
Vanderbilt University).   
37 See Statement of Christopher R. Drahozal, John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of 
Law, Arbitration: Is it Fair when Forced?: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (Oct. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-10-13DrahozalTestimony.pdf.  Professor Drahozal is, among other 
things, co-author of the Searle Civil Justice Institute Report on consumer arbitration.  See Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study Of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843 (2010). 
38 See infra Part V, final paragraph. 
39 Case No. 12-CA-25764, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012).   
40 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947) (right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.). 
41 D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184 at 4 (“When multiple named-employee-plaintiffs initiate the action, their 
activity is clearly concerted.  . . . Clearly, an individual who files a class or collective action regarding wages, hours or 
working conditions, whether in court or before an arbitrator, seeks to initiate or induce group action and is engaged in 
conduct protected by Section 7.”).   
42 See id. at 4–5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (noting NLRA Section 8 “makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights” guaranteed in Section 7”)). 
The EEOC reached a similar conclusion (although not specific to class actions) in 1997.  See Beth M. Primm, A 
Critical Look At The EEOC’s Policy Against Mandatory Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 151 (1999). 
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Whatever the merits of the Board’s decision,43 and whatever the possibilities for further 
appeals or other proceedings that may modify or overturn the Board’s ruling, the decision44  
demonstrates (at least in principle) that Congress could specifically act to preserve class action 
rights in one or more fields of law that may be affected by arbitration.45  Where Congress has not 
done so, the choice is significant.46 
The Supreme Court’s most recent arbitration-related decision, in CompuCredit Corp. v. 
Greenwood,47 highlights this point.  In CompuCredit, the Court cited the “liberal federal policy” 
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, which requires courts to enforce such agreements 
“even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims,” unless the FAA’s enforcement 
mandate “has been overridden by a contrary congressional command.”48  The Court, noting the 
“clarity” with which Congress has restricted the use of arbitration in some contexts,49 held that a 
statutory provision that merely references or contemplates judicial enforcement does not suffice 
to establish a “congressional command” to override the FAA.50  In short, if Congress wishes to 
eliminate arbitration of specific claims, or wishes to ensure class actions in support of specific 
claims, it is entirely free to do so, and Congress certainly knows how to do so.51  
                                                     
43 The Board acknowledged a potential conflict between its ruling and the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility.  See D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184 at 10 (noting the question of conflict between NLRA and FAA is “an 
issue of first impression” for the Board); id. at 15 (distinguishing AT&T Mobility).  In 2010, moreover, the Board’s 
General Counsel suggested a conclusion quite different from the Board’s ruling in D.R. Horton.  See NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORDANDUM GC 10-06, 
GUIDELINE MEMORANDUM CONCERNING UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES INVOLVING 
EMPLOYEE WAIVERS IN THE CONTEXT OF EMPLOYERS’ MANDATORY ARBITRATION POLICIES (2010) 
at 6 (suggesting that NLRA permits employees to band together to “test the validity of their individual agreements and 
to make their case to a court that class or collective action is necessary if their statutory rights are to be vindicated,” not 
that the NLRA invalidates all arbitration agreements that preclude class actions). 
44 The D.R. Horton case was heavily litigated, with the Board inviting (and receiving) extensive amicus briefs 
from interested parties.  See Case 12-CA-025764, Invitation To File Briefs, (June 16, 2011) available at www.nlrb.gov; 
Case 12-CA-025764, Docket Sheet (2011) available at www.nlrb.gov  (listing briefs received from U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, National Retail Federation, National Employment Lawyers Association and other groups). No doubt the 
case will produce additional litigation.  See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Backs Workers on Joint Arbitration 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/business/nlrb-backs-workers-on-
joint-arbitration-cases.html (“[T]he business community will be up in arms because you have federal labor law being 
applied in a nonunion setting.”) (quoting Professor Alex Colvin, professor at Cornell School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations)). Indeed, at least one court has already considered, and apparently rejected, the reasoning in D.R. Horton.  
See LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2308 at 16 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (court “declines to follow D.R. 
Horton); see also Samuel Estreicher & Kristina A. Yost, NLRB Reaches Into Employment Law to Invalidate Class 
Action Waivers, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2, 2012 at 4, 8 (D.R. Horton represents a “problematic ruling”).   
45 The D.R. Horton decision does not affect the rights of unions to waive individual rights (such as the right to 
pursue a class action) as part of the collective bargaining process.  See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 
(2009); see also Steven C. Bennett, Arbitration Of Employment Discrimination Claims: Impact of the Pyett Decision on 
Collective Bargaining, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23 (2009). 
46  See Scott v. Cingular, 160 Wash. 2d 843, 852 (2007); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The 
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005).  
47 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2011). 
48 Id. at 669 (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).   
49 See id. at 672 (citing examples).     
50 See id. at 671 (“[W]e have repeatedly recognized that contractually required arbitration of claims satisfies the 
statutory prescription of civil liability in court.”). 
51 The opposite rule, that “mere formulation of the cause of action” with reference to suit in court might preclude 
arbitration would mean that “valid arbitration agreements covering federal causes of action would be rare indeed.”  Id. 
at 670.  
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III. OVERRULING AT&T MOBILITY LLC V.  CONCEPCION BY STATUTE 
Congress made the FAA, and Congress may, if it wishes, amend or repeal the law.52  In 
1970, for example, Congress amended the FAA, to add Chapter Two, dealing with international 
arbitration agreements and awards under the New York Convention, and in 1990 Congress added 
Chapter Three, dealing with the Panama Convention.53   In theory, amendment of the FAA 
(through the AFA or any other similar enactment) could be used to overrule AT&T Mobility and 
any other pro-arbitration decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years. 
Yet, legislative revision of the judicially-constructed doctrine is fraught with (known and 
unknown) perils.54  Although proponents of the legislative modification of “incorrect” Supreme 
Court rulings point to some successful “narrow” legislative “overrides” of the Court;55 even 
“narrow” legislative efforts may produce unintended consequences.56  Inevitably, the Court (and 
the courts in general) may face circumstances that are similar to the original case, but not clearly 
within the statutory language of the override itself.57  Congress may draft “opaque” statutory 
terms,58 and thus “plain meaning,” legislative history and “purpose” analyses can produce wildly 
varying and unpredictable results. 59   Where the Court has not invited legislative action, 60 
moreover, there is some danger that the Court may strain to restrict new legislative terms.61   
                                                     
52 See William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75, 77 (2002) (“The time 
has come to considering amending the FAA to provide greater clarity for international arbitration.”); Joseph D. Becker, 
Fixing the Federal Arbitration Act by the Millennium, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75 (1997) (suggesting need for 
“renovation” of the FAA; “the dusting of an antique, not a revolution”). 
53 See generally STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS, 131–50 (2002) (summarizing U.S. law 
on international arbitration); Jarred Pinkston, Toward a Uniform Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act: The 
Role of 9 U.S.C. § 208 in the Arbitral Statutory Scheme, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 639 (2008) (reviewing interplay 
between FAA and U.S. international arbitration treaty commitments); John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and 
its Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (2000). 
54 See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 428 (1992) (noting “few identifiable patterns in the types of decisions that 
Congress overrules”).   
55 See Megan Coluccio, Fait Accompli?: Where the Supreme Court and Equal Pay Meet a Narrow Legislative 
Override Under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235 (2010).   
56 See Kathryn Eidmann, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of a Narrow Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971 
(2008). 
57 Deborah Widis, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional 
Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 515 (2009) (citing examples in the area of employment discrimination and 
noting in these circumstances, the original “shadow” precedents may “continue[] to hold sway”); id. at 423 
(“[O]verrides often fail to play their role as a check on judicial lawmaking.”). 
58 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA L. REV. 419, 431 (2005); see also Victoria F. 
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 
594 (2002) (citing examples of “deliberate ambiguity” in statutory drafting); GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE 
DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003) (suggesting that Congress 
deliberately drafts ambiguous statutes in order to defer to Supreme Court rulings on difficult issues). 
59 Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF  INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 31–37 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (criticizing use of legislative history), and Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be 
an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 807, 812–14 (1998) (noting frequent misuse of legislative history) 
with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847–61 
(1992) (noting value of legislative history) and Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the 
Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 230–32 (arguing for legislative history as reasonable guide to congressional  
intent); see also Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian 
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO L.J. 1119, 1122 (2001) (“[A]cademic theorists have no coherent idea 
of Congress, nor one based on what experts know about how Congress works.”). 
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The risk of congressional action also includes the prospect that, in some instances, 
Congress may agree with the Court’s ruling and expressly codify that view through legislation.62  
To a degree, the constitutional system of checks and balances operates on the assumption that the 
Court can accurately predict whether a congressional override might result from a controversial 
ruling.63  Further, in taking up a controversial topic, the legislature may attract lobbying attention, 
producing an entirely different structure from the “narrow,” even well-intentioned purposes of the 
initial proponents of the override.64  If anything, the stark alignment of interest groups on the 
questions that surround consumer and employee arbitration suggests that a “narrow” revision of 
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60 See generally Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court 
Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (1999). 
61 Professor Richard Paschal has called this phenomenon the “continuing colloquy” between Court and Congress.  
See Richard Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143, 
199–203 (1991); see also JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY 
COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 43 (2004).  Some hint of this tension may be seen in the “game” played between the 
Supreme Court and state courts over the application of unconscionability rules in the context of the FAA.  See Aaron-
Andrew Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008); see also Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?  Exploring the Recent Judicial 
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 484 (2009); Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469; Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes 
Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004). 
62 See Nancy C. Staudt, Rene Lindstadt & Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional 
Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340 (2007) (“Overrides, although the main 
focus of the extant literature, account for just a small portion of the legislative activity responding to the Court.  In fact, 
Congress is nearly as likely to support and affirm judicial decision-making through the codification of a case outcome 
as it is to reverse a decision through a legislative override.”); Virginia A. Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, Explaining the 
Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 7–8 (2005) 
(suggesting that Congress is most likely to override the Court when legislators are ideologically distant from the 
Court); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729, 729 (1991) 
(overrides may reflect “political upheaval or turmoil in which the Court’s erroneous interpretations appear to reflect 
deliberate attempts to frustrate the policy objectives of Congress”). 
63 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE 
L.J. 331, 335 (1991) (noting that the Court must consider congressional preferences in order to avoid risk of override); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 613 (1991) (applying game theory to interactions between branches of government on policy-making). 
64  See Virginia A. Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional 
Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 10 (2005); Joseph Ignagni & James Meernik, Explaining 
Congressional Attempts to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions, 47 POL. RES. Q. 353, 358 (1994); Harry P. Stumpf, 
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377, 391 (1965).  
Indeed, the very purpose of congressional overrides, in some instances, may be linked to interest group politics.  See 
Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding The Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from 
Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 487 (1991) (describing lobbying efforts for 
overrides that provide project-specific exemptions from environmental laws). 
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the FAA is almost impossible.65  Once modified, moreover, a new form of FAA could wreak 
havoc for years.66 
Experience with the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”) provides some 
indication of the scope and character of the problem in codifying a legislative solution to the 
issues addressed in AT&T Mobility.67  The Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”), largely modeled on 
the FAA, was first promulgated in 1955 by the National Commission on Uniform State Laws, and 
has been adopted by 35 states, with some 14 more using the UAA as a model for varied forms of 
state arbitration legislation.68  Drafting of the RUAA (starting in 1997) included consideration of 
the problem of adhesion contracts and unconscionability.  Yet, the drafters were unable to agree 
on a universal means to deal with the problem, and thus the RUAA merely mentions the problem 
and leaves to developing state (and federal) common law the means to its solution.69  Similarly, 
although the RUAA drafters took up the question of consolidation of arbitration proceedings, they 
chose not to include any specific provision in the RUAA regarding class action arbitral 
proceedings.70  If the framers of the RUAA, after three years of study, and eight formal meetings, 
including representatives from the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration 
Association and similar national arbitration service providers, and numerous interest group 
representatives, could not agree on solutions to these essential problems, it seems somewhat 
unlikely that Congress, in the context of overriding a Supreme Court precedent, is any more 
likely to make useful progress.71 
The legislative fate of the proposed Fair Arbitration Act (“FairArb”) further illustrates the 
difficulty. 72   This statutory scheme, offered by Senator Sessions, aims at providing a 
                                                     
65  AT&T Mobility, like most of the recent Supreme Court cases on consumer and employment arbitration, 
especially in the context of questions about class action treatment, drew amicus briefs from consumer and employee 
advocates, corporate counsel, trade groups and other interest groups.  See Frank Blechschmidt, All Alone in Arbitration: 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160. U. PA. L. REV. 541, 542 
(2012) (noting extensive briefing in light of “far-reaching implications for consumer and employment contracts and 
class action policy”); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 417 (2009) (noting the “maul[ing]” of U.S. arbitration law by the “claws of politicization”). 
66 See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1170 
(2011) (noting risk that, once Congress amends FAA, “Congress will naturally turn to other matters, and occasions for 
reexamination will be scant”). 
67 The texts of the UAA and the RUAA are available at www.nccusl.org.  For a summary of the RUAA, UAA, 
and other legislative efforts at modification of arbitration law, see Mary A. Bedikian, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
55 WAYNE L. REV. 21, 74–76 (2009). 
68 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Is it the Wrong Cure?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Summer 2002, at 10.   
69 See id. at 11; see also Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and 
Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2001). 
70  See Heinsz, supra note 69, at 15 (RUAA “does not address the hotly debated issue of class-action 
arbitrations”). 
71 Significantly, the RUAA has not received anywhere near the legislative support from the states seen in 
response to the original, more bare bones, form of the UAA.  Arbitration Act (2000), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20 (2000) (ten years after completion, 
RUAA has been adopted by only 14 states and the District of Columbia); see also Jack M. Graves, Arbitration as 
Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of Statutory Default Legal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 227, 247 (2011) (noting that “bare bones” form of FAA, instead of a “comprehensive and systematic 
approach” to the law of arbitration, “relies almost entirely on the common law of contracts, along with the developing 
federal common law” of arbitration, to fill statutory gaps). 
72 Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); Fair Arbitration Act of 2011, S. 1186, 112th Cong. 
(2011).  These bills have not addressed class action, class arbitration, or the AT&T Mobility case. 
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comprehensive set of “default” arbitration procedural rights for consumers and employees.73  This 
kind of scheme serves as an alternative to banning all pre-dispute arbitration agreements, or 
otherwise addressing the interplay between arbitration and class action procedures.74  The bill, 
like the AFA, however, has never progressed to a vote in either congressional chamber.75   
IV. POTENTIAL ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AFA 
The risk with introduction of the AFA in Congress is not simply that the legislation may 
go astray (failing to achieve its intended purposes).  The potential adverse consequences of the 
AFA, even if enacted precisely as its sponsors suggest, are manifest.  First, the AFA may actually 
reduce access to justice for some consumers and employees.76  For cases not subject to class 
action treatment, arbitration may provide a faster, cheaper justice system for individuals, 
                                                     
73 Senator Sessions, in describing the most recent form of the FairArb bill, stated: “Arbitration is a quick and 
cost-effective means of resolving disputes, but the process could be further improved to address some recent cases 
where individuals claimed that arbitrations were not conducted under fair conditions.  My legislation would establish 
reforms to make absolutely certain that arbitration is as fair as possible for all parties involved.”  See Sessions 
Comments On Fair Arbitration Act, June 16, 2011, JEFF SESSIONS, available at http://sessions.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressShop.NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=9e1c07bf-9116-cd9f-68a9-
44be4f5a4a17&Region_id=&Issue_id=; see also Andrew L. Sandler & Victoria Holstein-Childress, Supreme Court 
and Congress Focus on Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements: The Debate Continues, 27 CORP. OFFICERS & 
DIRECTORS LIABILITY, July 5, 2011, at 4 (suggesting that “Congress should address the fairness considerations 
[addressed in AT&T Mobility] by implementing specific procedural rules to balance arbitral mechanisms between 
businesses and their consumers or employees”); id. at 8 (FairArb bill is “[b]ased largely on the AAA’s Consumer Due 
Process Protocol,” and “seeks to ensure the continuing viability of arbitration while enhancing its effectiveness through 
certain reforms”). 
74 See Thomas W. Stipanowich, Revelation and Reaction: The Struggle to Shape Arbitration, Contemporary 
Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation (Pepperdine Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011/11), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757258 (noting recent Supreme Court decisions on 
“gateway” issues involving consolidation of claims in arbitration, and calling for legislation to establish due process 
standards for arbitration). 
75 See David D. Caron & Seth Schreiberg, Anticipating the 2009 U.S. “Fairness in Arbitration Act”, 2 WORLD 
ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 15 (2008); see also Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced 
Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361 (2010). 
76 The Association for Conflict Resolution (“ACR”), a group including more than 3,000 mediators, arbitrators, 
educators and others, issued a comprehensive report on the AFA, concluding: “Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration has 
the potential for developing a fast, efficient, fair, low-cost dispute resolution process to which all citizens could gain 
access[.]  By broadly making void and unenforceable pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate a future consumer, 
employment, franchise, or civil rights controversy, the proposed AFA eliminates this potential.  . . . [I]n the absence of 
a post dispute agreement to arbitrate, the AFA requires that all controversies be adjudicated in an appropriate court.  
However, there is no reasonable evidence that such a court forum is accessible to all parties[.]”  ASSOC. FOR CONFLICT 
RESOL., AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.acrnet.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/FinalReport%2012-1-09.pdf.  The ACR recommended against any 
form of the AFA that “broadly prohibits the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements[.]”  Id. at 13.  
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especially those who cannot afford counsel.77  Available evidence suggests, moreover, that when 
administered in accordance with essential due process standards, arbitration outcomes may be as 
favorable to employees and consumers as conventional litigation. 78   Once a dispute arises, 
however, parties are much less likely to agree to arbitrate, because the calculus of litigation 
(higher cost, but with greater procedural protection) versus arbitration (generally lower cost, but 
more informal) may change.79  
The AFA also introduces new questions of statutory interpretation and doctrine, which 
could increase the cost of conventional litigation.  The terms “consumer” and “civil rights” 
disputes, for example, presenting gateway issues in determining the application of the AFA, are 
                                                     
77 See Jyotin Hamid & Emily J. Mathieu, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Performing Surgery with a Hatchet 
Instead of a Scalpel?, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 769, 780 (2010–2011); Kirk D. Knutson, Anti-Arbitration Bills Imperil the 
Universal Benefits of Consumer Arbitration, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Aug. 1, 2008 (“[S]tudies have consistently 
shown that where similar subject matter is at issue, arbitration produces the same outcomes as court but in less time and 
at less expense.” (referencing research at www.adrforum.com/benefitsofarbitration)); Amy Cook, ADR is A-OK, CBA 
REC. (Chi. Bar Ass’n, Chicago, Il.), Apr. 1, 2008, at 6 (noting ABA survey finding that 78% of lawyers believe that 
arbitration was “timelier” than litigation, “and most said it was more cost effective”); Mark Fellows, Limits on 
Arbitration Would Burden Courts and Taxpayers, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Dec. 1, 2007, at 8 (“Surveys of 
arbitration participants consistently show that they spend less money resolving disputes in arbitration than in court.”); 
Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALBANY L. REV. 
241, 241 (1999) (“in exchange for reduced costs and speedier resolution, arbitrating parties agree to limit their right to 
appeal”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 429 (1988) (“[O]bservers 
frequently depict arbitration as a speedy and economical process.”). 
78  See CTR. FOR LEGAL SOLUTIONS, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON ARBITRATION OUTCOMES, available at 
http://www.centerforlegalsolutions.org/arbitration.data.shtml; Lisa Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Non-
Union Employment Disputes?  An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT’L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995) 
(study finding that employees won more often than employers and received a greater percentage of their demands, in 
arbitration).    
79 See Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can be Against Fairness?  The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 
CARDOZO J.  CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 280 (2008) (“[A] variety of empirical measures suggest that postdispute arbitration 
will not work.”); David Sherwin, Because it Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail 
to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 
(2003); Lewis J. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (2003).  Such a post-dispute agreement may be particularly difficult to 
achieve in the context of multi-party controversies.  See Carolyn B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua, Defining the Party —
Who is a Proper Party in an International Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association and Other 
International Institutions, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 711, 717-18 (2003) (where commonality of facts is sole link 
between parties, “impossible” to obtain consent to arbitrate from all parties). 
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not crystal clear. 80   The anti-arbitration “findings” of the AFA, moreover, could have 
meddlesome consequences, even outside of consumer, employment and civil rights arbitration.81 
Commentators have warned that fundamental changes in the FAA could adversely affect 
the position of the United States as a site for global dispute resolution.82  Due to the large volume 
of international commerce involving this country, the United States has become an important 
center for dispute resolution.83  The AFA, however, would overturn a “fundamental principle” of 
international arbitration law, to the effect that arbitrators normally may proceed with arbitration 
notwithstanding jurisdictional challenges.84   
Finally, despite the current controversy surrounding Supreme Court interpretation of the 
law, the FAA has served the U.S. (and international) arbitration community for roughly 80 
                                                     
80 See Mauricio Gomm Santos & Rodney Quinn Smith, The Changing Landscape of Arbitration in the United 
States and its Effects on International Arbitration, 14 (2010), available at 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1654354 (“The definitions of consumer and civil rights disputes 
remain quite broad.  Litigants seeking to avoid arbitration will be able to plead their claims through one of these two 
areas and require a judicial decision before going to arbitration.  These decisions would require opinions from all levels 
of the courts in order to define their parameters.  In the meantime, arbitration would experience a significant delay.”); 
David Caron & Seth Schreiberg, Anticipating the 2009 U.S. “Arbitration Fairness Act”, 2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION 
REV. 3 (2008) (AFA would alter doctrine of “separability” of arbitration contracts, requiring judicial interpretation). 
81 See Mark Kantor, Legislative Proposals Could Significantly Alter Arbitration in the United States, 74 ARB. 444 
(2008); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 49 (2010) (“very likely” 
that AFA and FairArb laws “will affect day-to-day commercial arbitration practice in unhelpful ways”); Alicia J. 
Surdyk, On the Continued Vitality of Securities Arbitration: Why Reform Efforts Must Not Preclude Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1131 (2009-2010); NEW YORK CNTY. LAWYERS ASS’N COMM. ON THE FED. 
COURTS, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2007, 249 F.R.D. 402 (Apr. 15, 2008) (“the findings 
of the AFA could have the unintended consequence of undermining all arbitrations,” not simply those within the 
“sectors” on which the law focuses). 
82 See Edna Sussman, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 455, 463 (2007) (“The proposed legislation would have a marked impact on the acceptability of the 
United States as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction.  It would not only reverse the trend over the past years towards 
more frequent selection of the U.S. as a seat for arbitration and potentially reduce the retention of U.S. dispute 
resolution institutions and arbitration specialists, but would also make U.S. businesses less attractive as trading 
partners.”); see also Mark Kantor, Congress Considers Legislation that Could Significantly Alter Arbitration in the 
United States, 1 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAW. 38, 39 (2008) (overturning doctrines of arbitrator competence to decide 
jurisdiction, and separability of arbitration agreements from remainder of contracts would “place the United States in 
opposition to decades of arbitration developments worldwide and arguably violate international obligations under a 
variety of international arbitration treaties”); Emmanuel Gaillard, International Arbitration Law, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 
2008, at 3 (stating that the AFA “pos[es] a serious threat to the promotion of efficient international dispute resolution 
and of the United States as a friendly place to arbitrate”); Thomas W. Stipanowich, Revelation and Reaction: The 
Struggle to Shape Arbitration, Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation, at 50 (Pepperdine 
University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011/11, 2011), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1757258 (“the breadth and ambiguity of the [AFA], and the 
potential impact of the statute on international transactions, is of great concern to the international business 
community”); cf. S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards 
When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1017 (2009). 
83 See PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, AMERICAN INFLUENCES ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 133–
34 (2009); Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 
84 (2003). 
84 See N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOC., REPORT OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION ON THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS 
ACT AND OTHER FEDERAL ARBITRATION BILLS, Mar. 18, 2009, at 7, available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Substantive_Reports&ContentID=52543&Template=/CM/ContentD
isplay.cfm; see id. at 8 (noting risk that AFA could have “a grave and harmful impact on international commerce”). 
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years.85  Critics suggest that the AFA, and any suggested reform of the nation’s fundamental 
arbitration law, must pass a “first, do no harm” test (which, to date, proponents have not 
satisfied).86  Further, to the extent that any reforms to the FAA might tend to decrease incentives 
to use arbitration, thus placing additional strains on overstretched courts, caution seems 
advisable.87   
V.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE AFA 
The search for appropriate alternatives to the AFA must start with competent empirical 
evidence.88  To the extent that AT&T Mobility implicates a choice between in-court, class action 
proceedings and individual proceedings in arbitration, questions include: (1) the frequency of use 
                                                     
85 Justin Kelly, Republican Senator Proposes Changes to FAA, THE DISP. RESOL. ADVOCATE (Disp. Resol. Sect. 
of the State Bar of Ga.), Summer 2007, at 2, available at  
http://www.gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/sections/disputeresolution/upload/summer07news.pdf (“My 
preference would be to leave the FAA alone, because it is working well for the vast majority of users.”) (quoting John 
M. Townsend); John M. Townsend, Leave the Federal Arbitration Act Alone, A.B.A. BUS. LITIG. COMM. NEWSLETTER, 
Summer 2007, (suggesting that FAA has worked well for 80 years); John M. Townsend, The Federal Arbitration Act is 
Too Important to Amend, INTL’L ARB. NEWS 2, 19 (2004). 
86 Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169, 170 (2007) (suggesting that FAA 
should be preserved, as courts are “more likely than legislators to get it right” and “the most plausible outcome would 
be to let loose all sorts of unanticipated errors and evils”); Thomas Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: 
Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 427 (2007) (suggesting need 
for careful consideration of any statutory reform of arbitration law, and suggesting possibility of a Restatement of 
Dispute Resolution as a means to produce new guidance in the field). 
87 See Edna Sussman, The Dodd-Frank Act: Seeking Fairness and the Public Interest in Consumer Arbitration, 
18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 25, 27 (2011) (“Court congestion and the recent cutbacks in judicial budgets are also relevant to 
the analysis [of need for arbitration systems] as they affect access to the courts for the resolution of disputes.”); David 
Allen Larson, The End of Arbitration as We Know it? Arbitration Under Attack, 3 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 93, 96 (2011) (“State budgets are in turmoil and legislators must make significant cuts.  Underfunded court 
systems that already were carefully rationing resources will have to find additional ways to reduce expenditures, which 
probably will require a further reduction in services.  As a result and as a simple, practical matter, the Judiciary needs 
healthy arbitral institutions and smoothly functioning arbitral processes.”); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2011) (“[A]rbitration arguably reduces the judiciary’s workload and reduces litigation costs, 
allowing companies to offer lower prices and higher wages.”).  Recent surveys of the impact of the economic crisis on 
courts support this concern.  See AM. BAR ASSOC. COALITION FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE 
IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/PublicDocuments/CoalitionforJusticeSurveyRepo
rt.authcheckdam.pdf (60% of judges reported seeing a greater number of self represented parties; 62% of these judges 
believed not having an attorney negatively impacted the outcomes for self represented parties); Editorial, Thread Bare 
American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at A20 (“State courts, which handle the vast majority of civil and 
criminal cases, are in a state of crisis.  . . . [These courts are] less and less able to deliver justice.”); see also Judith 
Resnik, Compared to What?:  ALI Aggregation and Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 632 (2011) (noting concern regarding “growing population” of persons in court without legal 
representation). 
88 Amy Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 
HARV. NEG. L. REV. 115, 118 (2010) (“The potential value of precluding or regulating arbitration clauses is . . . unclear.  
. . . [P]olicymakers propose policies in the dark by failing to consider existing empirical data that is critical to crafting 
effective and efficient arbitration reforms.”); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOC., DISPUTE RESOL. SECT., COMMENTS TO 
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 4 (2011) available at http://www.sussmanadr.com/articles.htm 
(“assessment of the public interest should include consideration of fairness to consumers” from changes in arbitration 
law) (listing specific questions); Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579 (2009). 
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of pre-dispute arbitration clauses containing class action waivers;89 (2) the degree to which such 
class action waiver clauses may preclude consumers and employees from vindicating their 
rights,90 and deterring wrongful conduct;91 (3) the degree to which class action devices would 
                                                     
89 See Peter Rutledge, Point: The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4, 7 (2009) 
(suggesting need for additional empirical research to determine whether adoption of class action waivers is a 
widespread problem); Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of 
the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 477, 503 (2009) (noting creation of new class arbitration waiver clauses, in light of judicial developments); 
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) (reviewing empirical studies and noting “consistent pattern of significant 
expansion of employment arbitration in the decade and a half since the Gilmer decision”); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat 
Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225 (1998) (suggesting that the “use of employment arbitration began to accelerate 
dramatically after the United States Supreme Court decided Gilmer”); see also Philip J. Loree, Jr., Stolt-Nielsen 
Delivers a New FAA Rule—and then Federalizes the Law of Contracts, 28 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 124 
(2010) (suggesting that Stolt-Nielsen “put the kibosh on class arbitration in the commercial context and most probably 
also in the context of adhesive contracts”). 
90 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 437 (2010) (stating that the “received wisdom” is that some businesses use arbitration 
clauses to avoid exposure to class actions and potential large-scale damage awards); David  S. Schwartz, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1319 (2009) (suggesting that businesses choose consumer 
arbitration agreements to avoid class action proceedings; “their primary concern is to deter claims, not to ensure that all 
claims against them are aired more cheaply”); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate 
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 
(2004).  Conversely, one may ask whether class actions necessarily provide “bang for the buck” results for consumers 
and employees.  See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. 
REV. 63, 85 (2008) (noting debate on whether class procedures encourage frivolous claims for settlement purposes); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1189 (2009) (“In 
some settlements, such as ‘coupon’ settlements . . . class counsel receive large fees while class members receive little 
or nothing of actual value.”); Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of 
Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343 (2005) (noting examples where plaintiffs’ lawyers are paid fees, and 
consumers receive no substantial compensation); see also S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 15 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 16 (Senate Committee Report on Class Action Fairness Act) (noting “numerous class-action 
settlements approved by state courts in which most—if not all—of the monetary benefits went to the class counsel”).  
91 An essential assumption in class action doctrine is to the effect that class proceedings tend to vindicate public 
rights, and deter wrongdoing, especially in small-stakes cases.  See AmChem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
617 (1997) (noting that “small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a sole action,” and 
suggesting that class actions can aggregate potential recoveries “into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor”); In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he class action is the only 
economically rational alternative when a large group of individuals . . . has suffered an alleged wrong but the damages 
due to any single individual . . . are too small to justify bringing an individual action.”); Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2005) (“Class action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they 
permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated 
into a single action against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm.”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation 
and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1902 
(2006) (noting central argument in opposition to class-action waivers, to the effect that they may affect public 
legislation by withdrawing a private right of action); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions: The Only 
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 843 (2002) (stating that the class action device is essential for 
“optimal deterrence” of wrongdoing). 
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solve these problems,92 and (4) the relative costs and benefits of an arbitral versus in-court class 
action system.93  More generally, if pre-dispute arbitration clauses are to be made invalid under 
the AFA (or similar legislation), policy-makers must consider: (1) the degree to which 
“mandatory” arbitration clauses produce results at odds with in-court procedures;94 (2) the degree 
to which access to arbitration may be adversely affected by a ban;95 and (3) impacts on the 
judicial system of reduced access to arbitration.96  The answers to these kinds of questions may 
determine whether any reform is necessary, and shed light on the most appropriate means of 
reform.97   
The “least harm” alternative to the AFA is precisely what has occurred over the past 
decade,98 since the AFA was first proposed: expanded development of arbitration “common law,” 
                                                     
92 See Arbitration: Is it Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. 14 (2011) 
(statement of Victor E. Schwartz) (noting that “the vast majority of consumer claims are individualized;” class actions 
“are of no help in these circumstances”); Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class 
Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1082 (2011) (“Class certification may well not be ‘superior’ to individual 
litigation—indeed, it may be inferior—on ‘fairness’ grounds due to the lack of need for aggregation of the prescribed 
dollar sum in order to provide a sufficient incentive” for claims) (quotation omitted). 
93 Is it correct, for example, as the Court assumed in AT&T Mobility, that the advantages of arbitration necessarily 
would be lost if the class action device were superimposed on arbitration?  See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 141 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010); David S. 
Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative 
History, 63 BUS. LAW. 55 (2007). 
94 Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (2011); Bradley Dillon-Coffman, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1108 (2010) (reviewing studies); Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. 
Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1062 
(2009) (reviewing empirical data); Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 556 (2008) 
(reviewing studies); Kirk D. Jensen, Summaries of Empirical Studies and Surveys Regarding How Individuals Fare in 
Arbitration, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 631 (2006) (summarizing studies and surveys); David Sherwyn, Samuel 
Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1569 (2005) (reviewing studies). 
95 Darren P. Lindamood, Redressing the Arbitration Process: An Alternative to the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 310 (2010) (preventing consumers from signing pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements “will result in less access to a remedy for plaintiffs with small claims. . . . [W]hen employers or 
manufacturers are not bound by a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, they can refuse to agree to arbitrate small claims 
with the knowledge that the high cost of litigation will prohibit the plaintiff from obtaining counsel.”); Andrew L. 
Sandler & Victoria Holstein-Childress, Supreme Court and Congress Focus on Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration 
Agreements: The Debate Continues, 27 CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY 1, 7 (2011) (“Prohibiting mandatory 
pre-dispute agreements likely would leave many consumers and employees without access to a viable dispute-
resolution forum, and would reward only the trial lawyer’s bar, which would stand to profit from the inevitable increase 
in litigation.”). 
96 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why it’s Better than it Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
783, 792 (2008) (study suggests that only 5% of employees claiming discrimination can gain access to court system; “it 
looks like arbitration—or nothing” as a remedy); Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration 
Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006); 
Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 10–11 (2003) 
(summarizing additional studies). 
97 Some empirical review of the effects of the Talent-Nelson Amendment, the Jamie Leigh Jones Amendment, 
and similar AFA-like enactments, see Part I, supra, might offer particularly valuable insights.  Similarly, the results of 
the analysis of arbitration processes in the consumer financial section, by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank law, may bear heavily on the debate over appropriate solutions.  See id.  
98 For a contemporary discussion of risk and policy-making (including the concept of “least harm” analysis), see 
RICHARD B. JONES, 20% CHANCE OF RAIN: EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF RISK (2nd ed. 2011). 
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at both the federal and state level.99  Judicial development of doctrine offers the advantage of 
nuanced response to perceived problems in arbitration law, versus the broad (and unpredictable) 
legislative approach.100  In particular, the scope of the unconscionability doctrine has yet to be 
fully explored.101  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that unconscionability is a general 
defense to enforcement of contracts that can be applied to arbitration clauses consistent with the 
FAA.102  Further, the Court has held that dispute resolution schemes that impinge on the ability to 
vindicate statutory rights may be invalidated.103  Although, given the presumption in favor of 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, the burden may fall on the party seeking to void an 
arbitration clause, 104  that burden is not impossible to sustain. 105   In particular, the 
unconscionability doctrine, a state law concept, offers a flexible form of protection for individual 
                                                     
99 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233 (2008) 
(tracing history of Supreme Court doctrine on enforcement of arbitration agreements). 
100 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1165 
(2011) (suggesting “a blend of industry self-regulation and case-by-case judicial scrutiny, over more blunt approaches 
such as regulation by an administrative agency or outright statutory prohibitions”).   
101 Despite claims of “overpreemption” of state law in Supreme Court jurisprudence on arbitration, Hiro N. 
Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2011), the Court has not fundamentally 
departed from the essential principle of preemption, that courts may not “invalidate arbitration agreements under state 
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(emphasis omitted).  The precise balance between federal preemption and state law, however, remains a matter for 
elaboration.  See David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129 (2004); David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act 
and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541 (2004). 
102 See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (stating that arbitration agreements may be invalidated by “generally 
applicable contract” defenses, including “fraud, duress, or unconscionability”); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. 
M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1995) (“[A]n arbitration clause may be invalid without violating the FAA if    
. . . the provision is unconscionable[.]”).  
103 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (stating that arbitration may substitute for 
judicial forum only “[s]o long as the prospective litigant may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the 
arbitral forum”) (quotations omitted) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 (1985)); see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 249 (2009) (“The decision to resolve [age 
discrimination] claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be free from 
workplace age discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the first instance[.]”).    
104 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (stating that the burden is on the 
opponent of arbitration to show the likelihood of incurring prohibitive costs in arbitration). 
105 See In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A]s the class action waiver in this 
case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights, we find the arbitration provision unenforceable.”);  see 
also Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1002, 1004–06 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that 
arbitration is inappropriate where plaintiff showed that lack of mutuality and unconscionability permeated the 
arbitration clause itself); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreement placing venue for hearing far from non-drafting party); Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 
Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 386–88 (6th Cir. 2005) (invalidating arbitration agreement where employer chose arbitration 
provider); Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir. 2002) (invalidating 
arbitration agreement where employee’s choice of arbitrator was limited to candidates initially screened by employer); 
Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 600, 614–15 (D.S.C. 1998) (refusing to enforce arbitration 
agreement that allowed drafting party to control pool of arbitrator candidates); Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. 
Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 173 (Wis. 2006) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement that only allowed drafting party to 
seek relief in court); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 255–56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding terms 
unconscionable in shrink-wrap arbitration contract relating to ICC arbitration).    
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rights, which legislation could not duplicate.106  Thus, claims that AT&T Mobility will somehow 
fundamentally alter state unconscionability law appear exaggerated.107  Although some courts 
have applied AT&T Mobility to uphold arbitration clauses against challenges,108  others have 
construed it quite narrowly.109 
Abundant additional “least harm” suggestions aim at potential abusive forms of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements and encouragement of the development of efficient, fair arbitration 
                                                     
106 See Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Revelation, Reaction and Reflection on the Direction 
of American Arbitration, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 21, 2011, 8:36 AM), www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/the-third-
arbitration-trilogy-revelation-reaction-and-reflection-on-the-direction-of-american-arbitration/ (noting that 
unconscionability doctrine gives judges a “potent tool to set boundaries on arbitration provisions in standardized 
contracts,” including limits on discovery, “unfair arbitrator selection schemes, requirements to arbitrate in a distant 
venue, and remedy-stripping clauses”); id. (“Although some worry that unconscionability affords courts too much 
discretion to strike down or modify arbitration agreements, there are currently no effective alternatives.”); Nina Pillard, 
Federal or State Regulation of Arbitration Procedure?, FUTURE OF ARBITRATION CONFERENCE (Mar. 2011), 
www.law.gwu.edu/News/2010-2011Events/Documents/Pillard%20Submission.pdf (suggesting that “state law is better 
equipped to serve as a protector of procedural fairness in arbitration than any newly fashioned federal version of FAA 
contract law of unconscionability likely would be”); see also Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory 
Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 616-19 (2009) (noting that 
unconscionability judicial decisions have grown in response to mandatory arbitration clauses). 
107  See Terry Moritz, AT&T Mobility and the End of Consumer Class Action Through Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence: Not so Fast, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:21 AM), www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-
and-the-end-of-consumer-class-action-through-commerce-clause-jurisprudence-not-so-fast/ (concerns motivating the 
AFA may be “premature” because “some lower courts are reading AT&T Mobility very narrowly”); Albert A. Foer & 
Evan P. Schultz, Will Two Roads Still Diverge?  Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law is Getting Harder in the United 
States. But Europe May be Making it Easier, 3 GLOBAL COMPET. LITIG. REV. 107, 109 (2011) (“[C]lass actions are not 
likely to completely disappear in practice. This is partially because the facts of Concepcion limit it as a precedent[.]”).   
108 See, e.g., Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 09CV 1951-LAB (WMc), 2011 WL 1691323, at *3 
(S.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (“[Concepcion] disapproved of “[the California Supreme Court opinion in] Discover Bank, 
holding it impermissibly interfered with the Federal Arbitration Act. That decision disposes of Bellow’s best argument, 
making clear the agreement to arbitrate is not substantively unconscionable merely because it includes a class action 
waiver. It is therefore not invalid, and will be enforced.”); Boyer v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, Civil No. 10CV1258 
JAH (WMc), 2011 WL 3047666 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2011) (arbitration class action dismissed); Daugherty v. Encana Oil 
& Gas (USA), Inc., Civil Action No. 10-cv-02272–WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011) (AT&T 
Mobility followed and arbitration class claims dismissed). 
109 See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (LBS)(JCF), 2011 WL 2671813, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2011) (distinguishing AT&T Mobility, as not involving federal statutory rights); In re Checking 
Account Overdraft Litig., No. 09–MD–02036–JLK, 2011 WL 6225275 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2011) (holding that 
defendants had waived rights to demand arbitration); Wolf v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., No. 10-CV-3338 (NLH) 
(KMW), 2011 WL 2490939 (D.N.J. June 22, 2011) (holding fee provision in arbitration agreement unconscionable, but 
severing that provision from remainder of agreement, which included class action waiver); NAACP of Camden Cnty. 
E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (invalidating arbitration agreement on grounds 
that it was too confusing, too vague, and too inconsistent to be enforced); Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 
P.3d 803 (voiding arbitration where named arbitration service was no longer available to conduct proceedings, and 
describing the agreement as unfairly one-sided and substantively unconscionable irrespective of AT&T Mobility 
holding).   
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systems.110  Major arbitration-sponsoring organizations have developed “due process” protocols 
for small-stakes arbitration.111  The development and use of such systems could be encouraged, 
through publicity and education,112 support for research and adoption of “model” systems by 
government units.113  In particular, on-line systems may offer low-cost means for mass dispute 
                                                     
110 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration (Univ. of Kan. 
Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 2011-4) (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract 
id=1904545 (suggesting that courts and policy-makers reinforce arbitration due process protocols, rather than banning 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Andrew L. Sandler & Victoria Holstein-Childress, Supreme Court and Congress 
Focus on Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements: The Debate Continues, 27 CORP. OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB. 1, 
4 (2011) (same); Amy Schmitz, Regulation Rash?  Questioning the AFA’s Approach for Protecting Arbitration 
Fairness, 10 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP. 16 (2009) (suggesting need for encouragement of use of arbitration due 
process protocols, in lieu of AFA, and identifying “top ten suggestions” for protocols); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping 
Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 258-60 (2007) (suggesting that, rather than resisting 
enforcement of arbitration clauses, consumer advocates should focus on arbitral impartiality and adherence to 
substantive law); Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37 (2007) 
(advancing need for procedural regulation in lieu of statute barring pre-dispute arbitration agreements).  Such systems, 
of course, are not a panacea.  See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Future Lies Down a Number of Divergent Paths, 6 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG. 16, 16 (2000) (“One-size-fits-all approaches [to arbitration] are outmoded and intrinsically 
problematic.”); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 372 
(2004) (“The lack of [enforcement] provisions makes it impossible to determine if the due process protocols are in fact 
being followed by individual arbitrators and arbitration service providers in actual cases.”).  Further, at least some 
suggest that legislation is required, to enforce such protocols.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: 
Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010) (suggesting 
that “shoulds” of arbitration due process protocols should become legislated “musts”). 
111 See, e.g., Consumer Due Process Protocol: Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Disputes 
Advisory Committee (Apr. 17, 1998), AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_005014&amp;revision=latestreleased (last visited 
May 23, 2012); JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Predispute Clauses:  Minimum Standards of 
Procedure Fairness (effective July 15, 2009), JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration/ (last visited May 
23, 2012).  See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 
383, 385–87 (2008) (differentiating between “mass” and “custom” arbitration proceedings).  
112 Consumer and employee education on the operation of arbitration systems may be essential to an effective 
system.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Considerations of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 123, 160 (2007) (noting that “consumers rarely read or understand” arbitration clauses); Debra Pogrund 
Stark & Jessic M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological 
Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 617 (2009) (discussing studies suggesting that consumers are unlikely to read standard 
form contracts); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 
57 (1997) (noting concern that individuals signing arbitration agreements do not understand the nature of arbitration).  
113  For general discussion on the notion of the government as a “model employer,” demonstrating the 
effectiveness of new systems for resolving disputes, see PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION (Dale 
Belman et al. eds., 1996).     
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resolution.114  Courts, moreover, may play a role in encouraging the use of fair and effective 
alternative dispute resolution.115 
Moving from encouragement and support to legislation that alters arbitration procedure, 
“least harm” alternatives to the AFA might focus on the essential problem posed by AT&T 
Mobility (and other recent decisions).  Is the class action system fundamentally inconsistent with 
arbitration processes?116  Additional research and experimentation certainly would help to answer 
that question.117  Further, if class arbitration is feasible and effective, should it be available as an 
option, even where parties have not agreed (in advance) to use that procedure?   
One alternative to the AFA would put the choice to “opt out” from arbitration in the 
hands of the individual.  A more targeted approach, focused on the potential need for class action 
treatment of certain disputes, might give both sides the option to opt out.  Where an individual 
claimant (subject to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement) could show that class action treatment is 
necessary for effective relief, the individual might demand class action arbitration.  If the 
responding party agreed, then the question of class certification in arbitration would be decided 
by an arbitration tribunal.118  If the responding party refused, then the individual might have the 
right to proceed with a request for class action treatment in federal court (subject to referral to 
individual arbitration if no class were certified).119  This form of “Class Arbitration Fairness Act” 
                                                     
114 The Online Dispute Resolution (“ODR”) program adopted for eBay buyers and sellers, for example, has 
produced successful resolution of tens of thousands of disputes.  See ebay.com, Resolving Transaction Problems in the 
Resolution Center, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/resolving-problems.html (last visited May 23, 2012).  For a 
discussion of other ODR programs, see, e.g., David A. Larson, “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?”  Technology Can 
Reduce Dispute Resolution Costs When Times are Tough and Improve Outcomes, 11 NEV. L.J. 523 (2011) (suggesting 
that creation of culture familiar with internet, cellular telephones and other electronic communications systems may 
foster use of technology-mediated dispute resolution); David A. Larson, Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution 
(TMDR): A New Paradigm for ADR, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 629 (2006); Jim Keane & Debi Miller-Moore, 
Linking Information Technology and Dispute Resolution: Framing the Future of Online Dispute Resolution Using 
OdrXML, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 58, 58-59 (2004) (discussing Cybersettle system, used in the insurance industry to produce 
70,000 settlements).   
115 See Steven C. Bennett, Court-Ordered ADR: Promises and Pitfalls, 71 PA. B.A. Q. 23 (2000). 
116 Compare Neal Troum, Drawing a Line After AT&T Mobility: How Far Does the FAA Reach into State 
Contract Regulation? 29 ALTERNATIVES 129, 135 (2011) (“Arbitration is not the place for class treatment, where there 
is a preemption of absent class members’ claims but no rigorous rules to ensure that such claims are preempted only 
after notice and lots of procedural hoops have been jumped through.”), with Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-
Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2011) (noting “doctrinal 
convergence” between litigation and arbitration); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A 
Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 265 (1990) (“nonsense” to equate arbitration and 
litigation, in expecting one to operate like the other).    
117 Such information may include experiences from abroad.  See S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes 
Through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 921 (2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1967101 (manuscript at 2) (noting that “[i]nterest in 
class and collective relief in arbitration is increasing all over the world”). 
118 Due process protocols for class arbitration have been proposed, and might be encouraged in the same manner 
as (more generally) due process protocols for consumer arbitration have developed.  See Carole J. Buckner, Due 
Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 259–63 (2006) (proposing due process protocols for class 
arbitration). 
119 Presumably, ordinary standards for class action certification would apply in federal proceedings, including 
proof of commonality of interest of the class members. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 
(2011) (holding that variations in circumstances of plaintiffs precluded class action treatment; plaintiffs must offer 
“significant proof” that employer operated under a “general policy” of discrimination, to establish commonality).  One 
can also imagine the addition of some form of sanction for frivolous demands of class treatment, where intended 
merely to avoid arbitration. 
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would, in part, overrule AT&T Mobility, but would also preserve the essence of FAA 
jurisprudence: the grounding of arbitration in freedom of contract.120  Although the ability to 
waive class action rights altogether would be affected, the choice of class arbitration treatment, 
and the methods of class arbitration, would remain in the hands of the parties.121  Thus, even if 
businesses consistently preferred in-court class litigation over class arbitration,122  the choice 
would be theirs, rather than imposed by court or Congress.123   
VI. CONCLUSION 
Vigorous debate on the wisdom of the Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility and 
related cases will, no doubt, continue.124  So, too, variations on the AFA legislative scheme may 
regularly appear in Congress.125  Finally, the newly-constituted Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau may influence the debate with release of its conclusions regarding arbitration procedures 
and the need for regulation.126  All three branches of government may take up these issues at the 
state level as well.   
                                                     
120 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and 
a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”) (quotations 
omitted) (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). 
121 In this regard, the proposal would involve much less change than a complete ban on pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements, or even an automatic right to class action treatment in court.  See Sarah Randolph Cole, On Babies and 
Bath Water: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. 
REV. 457, 498 (2011) (suggesting that any amendment of the FAA should focus on the need for a class vehicle for 
consumer arbitration, rather than banning all pre-dispute arbitration agreements; proposing an FAA amendment to the 
effect that an arbitration agreement with a consumer is “invalid to the extent that it precludes the consumer from 
accessing the court or arbitral system to participate in a class action”). 
122 See Jeffrey J. Greenbaum & Jason L. Jurkevich, Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements: Can They 
Survive?, 11 CLASS ACTION LITIG. RPT. 39, 49 (2010) (“Companies tend to be averse to class arbitration, believing it 
combines the disadvantages of class action litigation . . . with the disadvantages of arbitration[.]”); David S. Clancy & 
Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act’s Legislative History, 63 
BUS. LAW. 55, 62 (2007) (same). 
123 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 100–02 (2007) 
(suggesting that class arbitration processes could be modified to become more cost-effective and efficient, making them 
more attractive to individuals and businesses for resolution of large scale disputes); John H. Quisenberry & Susan 
Abitanta, Can Employers Preclude Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Agreements that are Silent as to 
Whether Classes are Permitted?, CONSUMER ATT’YS OF CAL. FORUM MAG., June 2005, at 22, 24–26 (suggesting that 
classwide arbitration, if properly administered, can provide parties with same benefits as in-court class proceedings).  
See also Philip Allan Lacovara, Class Action Arbitrations—The Challenge for the Business Community, 24 ARB. INT’L 
541 (2008).   
124 See Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938565 (noting that the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence “will continue to generate endless discussion”).  
125 See Nancy Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 
405 (2010) (describing AFA as “oft-introduced, oft-ignored” in Congress).    
126  Richard Cordray, newly appointed as Director of the Bureau, recently remarked: “We understand the 
importance of this issue, and we’ll be moving forward as required by Congress.” Michelle Singletary, Why You Cannot 
Take Your Credit Card Company to Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2012, at G1.  See also Arbitrate This!, COMPLIANCE 
RPTR., Aug. 8, 2011 (stating that it is not “outlandish” to foresee “a change in the landscape” from CFPB action); Kate 
Davidson, Supreme Court Gives Banks a Win on Arbitration, but Will CFPB Trump it?, AM. BANKER, Apr. 28, 2011 
(noting that “[s]ome banking lawyers said they do not think the CFPB has much room to change the law”). 
125 
We probably cannot (and should not) engage in a wholesale reconstruction of the 
American arbitration system.127  One hopes, at least, that the national debate can proceed with 
decorum and deliberation, and some common sense of purpose.128   
                                                     
127 The field of dispute system design, however, can improve understanding of the potential consequences of 
changes in the system.  See Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009) (offering framework for analysis of dispute systems); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, 
Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 
(2008) (providing an overview of the field of dispute systems design). 
128 In 2011, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings related to the AFA, entitled “Arbitration, Is It Fair 
When Forced?”  See Arbitration, Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. 108 
(2011) (statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“We may not all agree on the best ways to move forward, and on which 
legislative proposals are needed[.] . . . Perhaps today’s hearing can help us determine whether there is a sound middle 
ground[.]”). 
